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I. ARGUMENT 
A. The question as to whether Boyd-Davis met the Idaho Department of 
Labor's eligibility requirements for unemployment benefits is not at issue. 
The Idaho Department of Labor ("IDOL" or "Department") has never asserted that the 
Appellant/Claimant Terri Boyd-Davis was ineligible for unemployment benefits nor that she 
failed to prove her eligibility. Thus, when the Department asserts that "[t]he claimant carries the 
burden of proving that all eligibility requirement have been met," its focus is on the wrong issue. 
(Respondent's Brief, p. 6). The Department inaccurately rephrases this burden of proof when it 
states "[b ]ecause Appellant has the burden of proof, she must demonstrate by a preponderance of 
the evidence that she did not fail to provide her work search documentation when requested to do 
so by the Department." It is necessary that the focus is on the correct issue. The Idaho Industrial 
Commission ("Commission") accurately stated that the "real issue in this case" is "whether 
Claimant can be held accountable for failing to comply with the Department's request when she 
did purportedly not receive the Department's letter regarding that request." (R., p. 18). 
Based on the IDOL's faulty interpretation of when a "presumption of service" applies 
under Idaho law, the Department argues that Boyd-Davis can and should be held accountable for 
not responding to a letter the Appellant asserts she did not receive. There is simply no support 
under Idaho law - not in its statutes and not in case law - that provides support for the 
Department's position. 
B. There is no presumption of service that applies to the facts of this case. 
Appellant does not contest the IDOL's factual finding that she did not provide the 
information requested in the March 6 Online Review Letter by the deadline prOVided therein. 
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Boyd-Davis' position is that no presumption of service under Idaho statutes or case law applies 
to receipt of the letter upon its purported date of mailing and that therefore, the IDOL abused its 
discretion in denying her the benefits to which she was undisputedly entitled. 
1. The Gary case is distinguishable from this case. 
In support of its position that a presumption of service of the Online Review Letter 
applies in this case, the Department cites to a case from the United States District Court for the 
District ofIdaho, Gary v. Nichols, 447 F.Supp. 320 (D. Idaho 1978), claiming that it is 
"strikingly similar to this one." (Respondent's Brief, p. 7). While it is true in the Gary case that 
the Plaintiff challenged the adequacy of the notice he received, there are two ways in which this 
case is significantly different from the instant one. 
First, in Gary, the issue was not whether the notice was sent to the claimant nor was it 
whether it was received by the claimant. In that case, the notice was sent and it was received, but 
the claimant was out of town so he did not receive the notice until he returned from his trip, and 
it was then too late to timely reply to it. 
Secondly and more significantly is that in the Gary case the notice he challenged was a 
notice of redetermination. In fact, this case supports the arguments Boyd-Davis has made all 
along - that the presumption of service found in 1. C. 72-1368(5) applies only to the five notices 
specifically delineated therein, one of which is a notice of redetermination. In the Gary case, the 
District Court quoted the statute, "a notice [of a redetermination] shall be deemed served if 
delivered to the person being served or if mailed to his last known address; service by mail shall 
be deemed complete on the date of mailing" and thus accurately determined by the plain 
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language of the statute that "the plaintiff by statute must be deemed to have received notice of 
the redetermination on March 4, 1975, the stipulated date of mailing." Id. at 327. (Emphasis 
added.) 
The presumption of service in Gary was by statute. By statute (I.C. 72-1368(5)), a notice 
of redetermination is deemed served on the date of mailing. Boyd-Davis agrees. Boyd-Davis 
disagrees that the Gary case can in any way be said to provide support to the Department's 
argument that the Online Review Letter, which is not covered by I.C. 72-1368(5), was deemed 
served on Boyd-Davis on the date that the Department purports it was mailed. The Department 
argues that in Gary "[n]othing prevented the District Court from adopting the rationale in § 72-
1368(5) and nothing prevents the Commission form adopting the same rationale in determining 
whether Claimant met her burden of proof" (Respondent's Brief, p. 9). But the Department is 
wrong. Something does prevent the Commission from adopting the same rationale. This 
rationale does not apply here because in Gary the statute very specifically applied to the notice of 
redetermination, which was the piece of mail at issue in that case. In this case, I.C. 72-1368(5) 
does not apply to the Online Review Letter that the Department purportedly mailed to Boyd-
Davis. 
In Gary, the District Court cited to an Idaho Supreme Court case, Fouste v. Department 
o/Employment, 97 Idaho 162,540 P.2d 1341 (1975), which additionally confmns that I.e. 72-
1368(5) only applies to the specific notices delineated therein. The Fouste case "address[ed] and 
uph[eld] the notice provisions ofIdaho Code § 72-1368." Gary at 327. In the Fouste case, the 
Idaho Supreme Court stated: "What we are dealing with is a claimant who failed to properly 
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utilize the clearly established procedures/or appealing a determination a/ineligibility. The 
appellate procedure with its prescribed time limitations for perfecting appeals is reasonable and 
violates no federal directive or law." Fouste at 1346. (Emphasis added.) Again, the Fouste case 
concerned appellate procedure and a notice of determination, which 1. C. 72-1368(5) specifically 
designates as one of the notices covered by that section of Idaho Code, and which was 
significantly unlike our case which concerns a letter mailed by the Department to Boyd-Davis 
and which was prior to an appeal being filed. 
2. The Jones case, which concerns a state taking property and selling it for 
unpaid taxes, does not support the IDOL's position that in the instant case 
the Department was not required to provide Boyd-Davis with actual 
notice. 
Without explaining how exactly a U.S. Supreme Court case, Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 
220, 126 S.Ct. 1708 (2006), which concerns the issue of a State taking property and selling it for 
unpaid taxes, applies to the case at hand, the Department uses this case to support its position 
that "[d]ue process does not require the Department to provide actual notice." The IDOL argues 
that it was not required to provide Boyd-Davis with actual notice but "rather it is required to 
provide notice reasonably calculated under the circumstances to apprise interested parties, in this 
case Appellant, of the pendency of an action, or as in this case, the need to provide information 
to maintain her benefit eligibility." (Respondent's Brief, p. 7). This makes no sense. 
The Department does not explain why it does not have to provide the claimant with 
"actual notice" of the need to provide information to maintain benefit eligibility. The instant 
case concerns a completely different scenario than the Jones case. This is not a case about 
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selling property for unpaid taxes. The Department does not explain what - other than actual 
notice - would qualify as "notice reasonably calculated under the circumstances to 
apprise ... Appellant of. .. the need to provide information." In this case, other than "actual 
notice," the Appellant could not possibly have known she was required to provide this 
information. The Jones case does not apply here. 
3. The Idaho Supreme Court has confirmed that the notice provisions of Ie. 
72-1368(5) apply only to notices served on interested parties of 
determinations, redetermination and decisions of appeal examiners. 
In another Idaho Supreme Court case dealing with the presumption of service under I.e. 
72-1368, In re Dominy, 116 Idaho 727, 779 P.2d 402 (1989), the Court stated that Appellant 
"would have us apply the provisions ofI.C. § 72-1368(e)1 (Supp. 1988) to the facts here." This 
case further shoots down the Department's argument that "nothing prevents the Commission 
from adopting the same rationale" the Court applied in Gary. In the Dominy case, like our case, 
the party asking the Court to "apply the provisions ofI.C. § 72-1368(e)," was asking that these 
provisions be applied to something other than a notice of determination or redetermination. 
There, the Appellant wanted the Court to apply these provisions to "an appeal of a determination 
of coverage." The Idaho Supreme Court declined to apply these provisions, stating: 
Under that section [72-1368(e)], service by mail is deemed complete on the date 
of mailing. However, I.C. § 72-1368(e) deals with service of notice of 
determinations and redeterminations by D.o.E., not appeals by interested 
parties .... There is no indication in either I.e. § 72-1368(e) or (0 that the service 
by mail provisions referred to there were intended to apply to appeals. It is clear 
72-1368( 5) was previously 72-1368(e). It was recodified 1998. 
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from reading these provisions that they apply only to notices served on interested 
parties of determinations, redetermination and decisions of appeals examiners. 
Id. at 404, 405. (Emphasis added.) 
It was clear to the Court then and it is no less clear now that "these provisions ... apply 
only to notices served on interested parties of determinations, redetermination an decisions of 
appeal examiners." 
4. The "mailbox rule" does not apply to this case. 
The Department claims "[t]he rationale in § 72-1368(5) is based on a presumption 
recognized by many courts" - the mailbox rule." (Respondent's Brief, p. 9). 
The problem with comparing the mailbox rule to the facts of this case is that it simply 
does not apply. In support of its argument, the Department cites to five cases, four of which are 
cases from foreign jurisdictions. V\tl1ile the Department cites to one Idaho case, Hobson v. 
Security State Bank, 56 Idaho 60 57 P.2d 685 (1936), it tells us nothing about this case, does not 
explain what the holding in the case was, and does not provide even a quote from the case but 
appears to claim that "[ d]enial of receipt merely presents an issue of fact for the factfinder." 
(Respondent's Brief, p. 9). There is no way to determine how this case might support the 
IDOL's proposition. 
The Department argues that in the California case of Schikore v. Bankamerica 
Supplemental Retirement, 269 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 2001) that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
held that "a sworn statement that the letter was mailed is credible evidence for purpose of the 
mail box rule." What the Department neglects to explain is that immediately before stating that 
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holding, the Court noted that, "Schikore [] presented, as evidence a/mailing a sworn declaration 
that she mailed the benefit payment." Id at 964. (Emphasis added.) In our case, we have no 
sworn statement from the person who purportedly mailed the Online Review Letter. We do not 
even know who the person who allegedly mailed the letter is. We don't know because no one 
signed the letter and there is no certificate of mailing on the letter. The testimony provided by 
the IDOL in the instant case was by an assistant manager who testified only to the information in 
the Department's records. She did not purport to have been the one who mailed the letter nor did 
she identifY who it was that allegedly mailed the letter. The Department states that "[t]here was 
no evidence in the record that the letter was returned to the Department," (Respondent's Brief, p. 
10) but it could be asserted with just as much certainty that neither was there any evidence in the 
record that the letter wasn't returned to the Department. Besides the fact that the Schikore case is 
not an Idaho case and does not have anything to do with unemployment benefits, its facts are 
different than ours. In the instant case we do not have a sworn statement that the letter was 
mailed. 
The mailbox rule is a rule that typically applies to contract law. Black's Law Dictionary, 
6th Ed defines the "mailbox rule" as follows: "In contract law, unless otherwise agreed or 
provided by law, acceptance of offer is effective when deposited in mail if properly addressed." 
It is unclear how the Department believes that a rule that applies to acceptance of an offer in 
contract law also applies to the facts of this case. The Department does not provide any clear 
argument as to why the "mailbox rule" should be applied in this case. In Idaho, outside of 
contract law, there is no evidence that the mailbox rule applies in any other circumstances other 
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than "for purposes of pro se inmates filing petitions for post-conviction relief," Munson v. State, 
128 Idaho 639,643,917 P.2d 796, 800 (1996). 
The IDOL has made no convincing argument that the mailbox rule applies to the facts of 
this case. 
II. CONCLUSION 
The IDOL admits the Industrial Commission abused its discretion in determining that 
Boyd-Davis was ineligible for benefits. The IDOL is further unable to show that a presumption 
of service applies to the facts of this case. 
Boyd-Davis was undisputedly eligible for unemployment benefits and the IDOL's refusal 
to pay her the benefits to which she was entitled resulted in violating the very purpose for which 
of the Idaho Employment Law was enacted. 
Thus, the Industrial Commission's Decision should be overturned and the IDOL should 
be ordered to pay to Claimant Terri Boyd-Davis the UE benefits for the period of March 10-30, 
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